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Drafi Resolutinn
on parliamentary co-operotian in the Meditenanean
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling Recommendation 538 on security in the Mediterranean in which it affirmed that " Wes-
tern Europe's historic relations give it a specific responsibility to promote economic and social develop-
ment, peace and security in the Mediterranean ";
(ii) Concerned by the persistence of conflict and various crisis situations in the Mediterranean region;
(iiil Noting that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional armaments of all
kinds in the Mediterranean region is a threat to peace and stability in the region;
(iv) Convinced that security problems cannot be separated from development problems which affect the
stability of the whole Mediterranean region;
(v) Welcoming the development of the dialogue between WEU and the countries on the southern
shores of the Mediterranean and the signing of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements between the
European Union and certain Mediterranean countries;
(vi) Expressing the wish that the Euro-Mediterranean conference in November 1995 will make a deci-
sive contribution to instituting true political means for promoting security and co-operation in the region,
hwrres rHE pARLIAMENTS oF MEMBER couNTRIEs
1. To intensify interparliamentary co-operation in regard to Mediterranean questions;
2. To encourage exchanges between their respective foreign affairs and defence committees and co-
operation between the latter and the corresponding committees of the WEU Assembly in order to work out
a Euro-Mediterranean policy taking into account the problems of security and development;
3. To participate actively in the work of the interparliamentary conference on security and co-opera-
tion in the Mediterranean, endeavouring, insofar as possible, to present joint proposals by the parliaments
of the countries and Assembly of WEU;
4. To encourage the governments of the Mediterranean countries which are members of WEU to
express clearly their national priorities with regard to the Mediterranean and its problems;
5. To encourage and to foster contacts between parliamentarians on both sides of the Mediterranean
with a view to developing the dialogue on political, economic, social, cultural and security questions.
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Explnnatory Memorandum
(submifred by Mn Kotsonis, Rapporteur)
I.Introductian
1. The Assembly of WEU has always paid the
closest attention to the problems of the Mediterra-
nean region which have been the subject of seve-
ral reports and recommendations to the Council of
Ministers. In some cases, together with simulta-
neous intervention from other institutions, such as
the Council of Europe and the Interparliamentary
Union, practical results have been obtained such
as the setting up of a Conference on Security and
Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).
2. At frst sight it does not seem easy to tackle
this problem from a parliamentary point of view.
The region is a heterogenous group of cultures,
levels of development, and religious and ethnic
goups. There are many causes of conflict both
North and South and from East to West of the
Mediterranean. The present report will not give
preference to such distinctions but rather will
attempt to kckle the question as a whole, putting
forward the practical action undertaken by natio-
nal parliaments of WEU member countriesr and
by other institutions for interparliamentary co-
operation in relation to the region.
3. It is clear that the problems of the Mediter-
ranean primarily concern the riparian countries,
but the political, economic and indeed military
consequences of the development of the regional
situation have repercussions on European coun-
tries as a whole. The economic imbalance, demo-
graphic and migratory pressures towards the nor-
thern shore, the proliferation of every kind of
armament, to both East and South, the persistence
of unresolved disputes and conflicts despite
repeated intervention on the part of international
and European authorities are factors conributing
to crises which concern all European countries.
4. Parliamentary intervention here has a
considerable r6le to play, providing the necessary
complement to diplomatic action without always
being bound by the same consfiaints as the latter.
Friendship groups irmong parliamentarians, reci-
procal visits, discussions, colloquies and other
activities contribute significantly to the dialogue
between Mediterranean countries and beyond.
This parliamentary diplomacy encourages
exchanges of views and an understanding of posi-
tions on all sides leading to long-term action
whose results are not immediately perceptible but
eventually promote development and stability in
the Mediterranean region.
5. Interparliamentary institutions provide a
wider framework for regional dialogue. The
Council of Europe is one of the organisations
most cominitted to this course even if its enlarge-
ment to the Central European countries might
have given cause for fearing that a more continen-
tal focus might be adopted for its activities. The
European Parliament, through its power of co-
decision in certain areas in agreement with the
Commission, is inevitably a major factor in rela-
tions between the European Union and the Medi-
terranean countries. The WEU Assembly and the
North Atlantic Assembly are for their part more
concerned with security and defence questions
which are of vital importance in a region where
potential or indeed open conflicts are a permanent
feature.
II. Secarity and develapment
in the Medilenanean
Given the extreme diversity of the compo-
nents, it is difficult to deal with the overall issues
in this area. Between North and South, East and
West, there are many variations including within
these geographical divisions. Unequal economic
development, the plurality of political systems,
divergent perceptions of security, quite strong
demographic growth, are some of the factors
which constitute its regional complexity. Never-
theless, it is possible to focus our analysis on two
major axes which are both complimentary and
interconnected: security and development.
7. The cold war had led to a reductive assess-
ment being made of the security problems of the
region. At that time, for NATO and to a lesser
extent for WEU, it was a matter of countering the
threat of the Soviet presence on European and
American lines of communication and trade
routes in the region. This was then the main
preoccupation of decision-makers on the northern
shore, although there were interregional tensions
such as the crisis in Cyprus or the civil war in
Lebanon.
8. From the late 1980s, perceptions changed
and there was a move from a global assessment 
-
the East-West conflict 
- 
to a regional analysis of
6.
1. Including Turkey, a Mediterranean country whose
influence and importance for the stabiliry and development
of the region needs no explanation.
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security questions. The aftermath of the Gulf war
created the impression for a short time of a major
Mediterranean debate that might lead to settle-
ment of certain situations of conflict. However,
very quickly, as the end of the civil war in Leba-
non showed, there was a return to traditional
regional power relationships, the most striking
examples being Cyprus and the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. At the same time another major
question emerged 
- 
the proliferation of all types
of armaments including ballistic missiles, chemi-
cal weapons and even nuclear programmes for
military purposes in the region.
9. In parallel, the problem of development is
becoming very acute. The disparity of economic
standards between the northern and southern
shores, relations between member counfiies of the
European Union and countries which are not yet
or are unlikely to be members, are sensitive and
complicated issues, only a few main aspects of
which will be examined. Economic issues here
have virtually a direct impact on security matters,
flust within the states of the region themselves and
then as regards their external relations. The absen-
ce of encouraging economic prospects in the
medium term for certain countries in the South
has made them vulnerable to penetration by Isla-
mic extremism, which, in certain cases, has exten-
ded its activities to other countries; the increase in
the birth rate and migratory pressures are also pro-
blems to be taken into account even if all coun-
tries do not share the same perceptions in this
area.
(a) Contlict in the Meditenanean and European security
10. The Assembly of WEU has produced seve-
ral reports on this topic which it has tackled from
a political and military angle. In the framework of
the present report, we will deal with the problem
briefly by sketching an outline of the open and
potential conflicts in the region and also of deve-
lopment and demographic issues having an
impact on security.
1. Open and potential conflicts in the Meditena-
nean regron
11. Several types of security problem can be
distinguished: those internal to a country, those
involving more than one country and matters of
common concern, as in the case of conventional
armaments proliferation and that of weapons of
mass destruction. This distinction is not exhaust-
ive and there are correlations between the diffe-
rent aspects. In order to simplify and to remain
within the scope of our report we shall leave aside
the conflict in the Balkans and the Arab-Israeli
peace process (except in terms of the Palestinian
aspect).
(i) Intra-state conflict
12. Since the late 1980s, several countries in
the region have experienced internal disturbance
due to opposition between the r6gime in power
and more or less extremist Islamic groups. Alge-
ria and Egypt provide a typical example even if
their situation is not comparable. A characteristic
of the Algerian crisis, which has reached virtually
civil war proportions, is the transfer of terrorist
acts to France which tends to some extent to
involve Europe in the conflict.
13. Tunisia has so far succeeded in controlling
the action of exffemist groups but at the expense
of significant encroachment on political freedom
and of human rights violations. The Israeli-Pales-
tinian peace process has not yet put an end to ter-
rorist acts committed by both Islamic and Jewish
extremists. Ttrrkey has to face up to the actions of
the PKK although the Kurdish problem cannot be
reduced to this confrontation, its solution being
linked to the evolution of Tirkish society and Tur-
kish institutions as a whole.
(ii) Inter-stateconflicts2
14. Turkish reaction to the application of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea and especially
the Cyprus question have for decades been a
source of dispute between Greece and Turkey,
although both are members of the Atlantic Alli-
ance3. The invasion of Cyprus by the Ttrrkish army
in 1974led to the occupation of a large part of the
island which continues to the present day, despite
United Nations resolutions and the disapproval of
the international community. The good offices of
the United Nations have not led to a just and las-
ting settlement of the Cyprus question, which must
be based on a Cypriot state with a single interna-
tional personality and citizenship, whose indepen-
dence and territorial integrity are guaranteed. In
the meantime, the status quo in Cyprus, which is
regarded as unacceptable by the United Nations
and the European Union, is perpetuating the divi-
sion of the island and causing the population to
suffer, since it gives rise, inter alia to violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
15. T[rkish opposition to Greece's extension of
its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea is also a
potential source of conflict between the two coun-
tries. To Greece's decision to implement to its
advantage the provisions of Article 3 of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea which stipu-
lates that " Every state has the right to establish
the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
2. For detailed analysis of these questions see Document
1465 on the Eastem Mediterranean, Rapporteur: Mr. Cuc6
(Spain),24thMay 1995.
3. Turkey has been an associate member of WEU since 1995,
with effect from the date of Greece's accession to full mem-
bership.
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exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from base-
lines determined in accordance with this conven-
tion o', Turkey responded by invoking Article 300
of the same convention on abuse of rights, even
going so far as to state that the extension would be
regarded as a casus belli. The Greek Government,
by stating that the entry into force of the conven-
tion would not have immediate effect, has how-
ever contributed to lowering the tension even
though the risk of conflict has not been eliminated
entirely.
(iii) Proliferation of conventional weapons and
weapons of mass destructiona
16. Armaments proliferation is one of the prio-
rity issues in security and defence matters in the
Mediterranean region. The end of the cold war,
the aftermath of the Gulf war and the start of the
Arab-Israeli peace process seemed to indicate for
a while that the Mediterranean would become a
safer area. In reality, the level of weapons has not
fallen, whatever the rype of weapon considered.
In terms of conventional weapons, Greece and
Turkey have had the benefit of major transfers of
heavy weapons due to the application of the CFE-
1 and CFE-1A treaties on armaments reduction in
Europe; Israel and Egypt still receive major mili-
tary aid from the United States while the risks of
an open conflict breaking out between Israel and
its neighbours are diminishing.
17. Weapons of mass destruction, ballistic mis-
siles, chemical and bacteriological weapons and
nuclear proliferation are a major concern in the
region. While Libya seems to have a fairly well
developed chemical weapons programme, which
is nevertheless subject to international and espe-
cially United States monitoring, other countries
have opted for ballistic missiles and nuclear pro-
grarnmes, first among them being Israel which is
an undeclared nuclear power. Algeria and more
recently Egypt are also beteved to have nuclear
programmes for non-exclusively civilian pur-
poses. In this area, it might be desirable to envis-
age at some future time a Mediterranean variant
of all types of arms reduction agreements like
those in force in continental Europe.
2. Develapment and demography in the Mediter-
ranean regian
18. The Mediterranean basin is an area of very
marked diversity, not to say dispariry in levels of
economic, social and political development.
These differences exist not only between the nor-
thern and southern shores but also within each of
these zones. Development problems have a demo-
graphic component, which is a source of concern
in certain northern countries that are having diffi-
culty in integrating immigrants of Meditenanean
4. This question is dealt with in the appendix to the present
report.
origin. This is also true, for example, for the deve-
lopment of relations between the European Union
and Turkey.
19. The issue of development arises not only
from purely economic factors (GDP, GNP, indus-
rial production, etc.) but is also linked to the dis-
tribution of natural resources in the region. Fore-
most among them are oil and water. The bulk of
oil resources are concentrated in two countries,
Algeria and Libya; one is close to civil war and
the other under international embargo. Without an
improvement in the positions in these countries,
Europe will have to turn to other sources of sup-
ply such as oil from Azerbaijan which might be
brought through the Mediterranean region.
20. Water will be a source of conflict in the
next century if a system of rational and balanced
management is not established between the coun-
tries of the region; it is already at the centre of dif-
ficult discussions between Israel, the Palestinian
authorities and Jordan and between Turkey, Syria
and Iraq. Here again resources are unequally dis-
tributed and three types of coun[ry can be identi-
fied: those with generous supplies for decades to
come (Albania, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon,
Turkey, former Yugoslavia); those whose
resources will diminish during the next century
but which can hope to maintain reasonable levels
on condition that demand, and consequently
population growth, remain stable (Algeria,
Cyprus, Spain, Morocco) and those with very
meagre resources, a situation likely to increase
tension between neighbouring countries (Egypt,
Israel, Libya, Malta, Syria, Tunisia)5.
2I. Membership of different economic areas
also helps to accentuate discrepancies in the
region. The Mediterranean countries of the Euro-
pean Union benefit from major transfers of aid
which have contributed to their development and
integration in the community's economic area. To
varying degrees, countries such as Turkey and
Morocco are having considerable difficulties in
their relationship with the Union. Turkey, signa-
tory of a major association agreement, has not yet
sueceeded in being considered as a true candidate
for full accession for economic and demographic
reasons, not to mention the religious aspect.
Morocco, with more modest aspirations, has just
had an important setback in negotiations with the
Union over fishing rights. These two cases also
illustrate the existence of political and cultural
deadlocks in relations between Christian and
Muslim Mediterranean countries.
22. Regional demographic growth, especially
in Turkey and the Maghreb countries, and its
5. "La M6diterran6e, nouveaux d6fis, nouveaux risques ",
edited by Jean Frangois Daguzan and Raoul Girardet, page
40, Publisud, 1995.
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corollary, the exacerbation of the economic situa-
tion and increased migration towards the Euro-
pean Union countries of the northern shore,
constitutes a considerable source of concern for
years to come. This is nevertheless an area in
which data has to be treated with caution, as
demographic evolution is linked to cultural and
social factors which are likely to change in future
decades and any improvement in the economic
situation or rise in cultural levels, especially for
women, will help to slow down the growth in the
birth rate.
23. The crux of the problem lies in the age dif-
ferences between the populations of the two
shores. If there are no major demographic
changes, the countries of the European Union will
experience increased aging oftheir populations in
the twenty-first century while in the northern and
southern Mediterranean countries outside the
Union the section of the population under 15
years of age will continue to increase 6. Unless
there is a perceptible improvement in present eco-
nomic conditions, migratory pressure will conti-
nue to grow stronger constituting a threat to secu-
rity in the region.
24. Although as yet no satisfactory solution has
been found, an awareness of the problem is evi-
dent in the document adopted by the WEU Coun-
cil of Ministers in Lisbon on 15th May 1995,
entitled " Common reflection on the new Euro-
pean security conditions ", which deals with pro-
blems relating to uncontrolled or illegal migration
in a section on new risks for European securityT.
After summarising briefly the factors underlying
uncontrolled or illegal migration, the document
states that these problems have become " an issue
relevant to European stability and security " and
raise " substantial security concerns " such as:
"massive displacements of persons in particular
as a consequence of internal upheavals or armed
conflicts in areas adjacent to our countries; illegal
migration [which] compose a threat to internal
security and affect law and order in our societies(links with organised crime, " importation " of
political conflicts elsewhere) ". The Council also
considers that " other problems may relate to the
cost to host countries of dealing with large
influxes of immigrants both financially and in
social terms ".
(b) WEU andthe Mediterranean
25. During the cold war, WEU,lacking a mili-
tary structure of its own, made only a very limited
contribution in the region on behalf of the Atlan-
6. " La M6diterran6e, nouveaux d6fis, nouveaux risques ",
edited by Jean Frangois Daguzan and Raoul Girardet, page
57, Publisud, 1995.
7. A/WEU/DG (95) 16,6th June 1995.
tic Alliance. The Soviet military presence and the
Arab-Israeli conflict were then the major preoccu-
pations and, until 1990, only two member coun-
tries, France and Italy, were Mediterranean coun-
tries. Today, five of the ten member countries are
situated either in the region or in the vicinity (Por-
tugal), to which is added Turkey, an associate
member. This presence has led to greater and
more sustained attention being paid to the pro-
blems of the region.
26. With effect from the 1980s, Mediterranean
questions began to be dealt with in their own right
in the communiqu6s of the Council of Ministers
and in its annual report. Initially, the topic was
presented in a cold war perspective, but was sub-
sequently to be dealt with on a broader basis. At
the meeting held in Luxembourg on 13th-14th
October 1986, " the French and Italian Delega-
tions have agreed to undertake an examination of
this subject, leading to the possible convening ofa
working group " t. The sub-group on security in
the Mediterranean, composed of representatives
of the ministries for foreign affairs and defence,
and placed under the authority of the Permanent
Council, was established in April 1987.
27. The sub-group is " the place for consulta-
tion and joint reflection on all questions affecting
security in the Mediterranean. Where appropriate,
this consultation will lead to the formulation of
positions or joint recommendations that may be
transmitted to the Permanent Council. The sub-
group is competent to analyse all factors of desta-
bilisation and developments in the countries situa-
ted in the vulnerable areas both as regards internal
politics and international relations, whether bila-
teral or multilateral and including their specifical-
ly military aspects " e. The early work of the sub-
group dealt with the Balkans, Cyprus, the
Maghreb and Malta'o.
28. In 1988, WEU's " Mediterranean compo-
nent " was strengthened by the accession of Spain
and Porrugal, while Turkey and Greece in their
turn made known their wish to accede. In 1989 the
Council agreed to establish a consultation proce-
dure with the two countries at ministerial level
pending a final decision on their application'r 
- 
a
decision that was to be taken at the Petersberg
meeting in 1992 when Greece and Turkey were
invited to join WEU, the first as a full member
and the second as an associate member.
8. Document 1093, second part of the thirty-second annual
re-p-ort of the Council to the Assembly of WEU, 27th Apdrl
1987.
9. Document 1155, second part of the thirty-fourth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly of WEU, 10th October
1987.
10. Idem.
ll. Document 1180, WEU Ministerial Council, 10th April
1989.
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29. For its part, the Mediterranean sub-group
has, from the late 1980s, been concentrating its
activities on Yugoslavia and the Maghreb. Regar-
ding the latter, it considers that " In this region,
threats to stability are not essentially of a political
nature but derive from the political, social, demo-
graphic and above all economic factors apt to pro-
duce change in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia "'2.
At its meeting on 20th October, the sub-group
also considered a "joint report regarding naval
deployments in the Mediterranean which under-
lines the need for European countries to carry on
shouldering their responsibilities in the Mediter-
ranean basin with adequate forces to play an act-
ive peace-time r6le in the prevention, and if the
need arises, management of local crises "13.
30. From 1990 onwards, the Mediterranean
sub-group began to take an interest in o'the impli-
cations for European security of the proliferation
of ballistic missiles which, in view of the range of
this type of weapon ... constitute a greater poten-
tial threat not only to the WEU countries borde-
ring on the Mediterranean "'0. The North-South
dimension of European security and economic
development should also be taken into considera-
tion in the development of a European security
policy'5. The Gulf crisis and then the Gulf war
were to contribute to promoting the idea of a
conference on security and co-operation in the
Mediterranean16, but without it being clear what
r6le WEU might play in the process; the work of
the sub-group also came to include an examina-
tion of contacts to be established between WEU
and the Maghreb countries'7 and the question of
Islamic exfremism (especially from 1992).
31. In 1993, the Mediterranean sub-group
became the Mediterranean Group, with unchan-
ged responsibilities. Its work made it possible to
establish a perrnanent dialogue between WEU
and the Maghreb countries, which is still conti-
nuing today, but without many practical initiatives
being taken. Since 1994, the activities of the
Group have been stepped up at the request of the
Council, its responsibilities have been better defi-
12. Document 1200, first part of the thirty-fifth annual report
of the Council to the Assembly of WEU, l3th October 1989.
13. Document 1210, Information letter from Mr. van Eeke-
len, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the
ministerial organs, 27th November 1989.
14. Document 1217, Information letter from Mr. van Eeke-
len, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the
ministerial organs, l5th March 1990.
15. Document 1219, second part of the thirry-fifth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly, Appendix II, 25th
May 1992.
16. Document 1238, Information letter from Mr. van Eeke-
len, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the
ministerial organs, lOth September 1990.
17. Document 1315, second part ofthe thirty-seventh annual
report of the Council to the Assembly, Appendix tr, 25th
May,1992.
ned and it may be assigned aspects of the work of
other groups which fall within its purview. In its
work, it must also take account of " the entry into
force of the Treaty on European Union, the imple-
mentation of the CFSP, WEU's r6le as the defen-
ce component of the European Union and mea-
sures aimed at ensuring close co-operation
between the European Union and WEU " and
" the close working relations between WEU and
NATO, based on ffansparency and complementa-
rity " 't.
32. The preliminary conclusions on the formu-
lation of a common European defence policy
adopted by the Council of Ministers at Noord-
wijk on 14th November 1994 were an important
step in the development of a Mediterranean secu-
rity policy. This document states that WEU
governments " have an interest, in order to rein-
force European security, in fostering stability in
the southern Mediterranean countries " this being
one of the levels of " European responsibilities
and interests in the freld of defence "re. It is wor-
thy of note that this document deals with relations
with the Mediterranean region under the same
heading as those with the Central European coun-
tries, not separately. It states, moreover, that
" European security also has a Mediterranean
dimension ". At the Noordwijk meeting, the
Council also decided to expand to Egypt the dia-
logue with the southern Mediterranean countries.
33. In 1995, the Mediterranean dialogue was
extended to Israel, but the most important deci-
sion was to create a marine force bringing toge-
ther France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, open to
other WEU countries and declared " a force ans-
werable to WEU, EUROMARFOR "'0. This force
is intended to operate primarily in the Mediterra-
nean, in conjunction with a land force, EURO-
FOR, organised by the same countries. This is an
important initiative aiming to ensure that WEU
has an operational presence in the region and it
would be desirable for Greece to participate. The
association of Turkey under a:rangements com-
mensurate with its status, would give total Medi-
terranean cover. The Lisbon ministerial meeting
also adopted the document entitled 'o Common
reflection on the new European security condi-
tions " which pays particular attention to the
Mediterranean basin as a " high priority for Euro-
pean security " zr. The Council of Ministers has
also decided to enter into a dialogue with Cyprus
18. Document 1433, fust part of the fortieth annual report of
the Council to the Assembly of WEU, 9th November 1994.
19. Document 1443, Preliminary conclusions on the formula-
tion of a common European defence policy, l8th November
1994.
20. Document 1455, WEU Council of Ministers, Lisbon,
t5th May 1995.
21. A/WEU/DG (95) 16, 6th June 1995.
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and Malta which is intended to evolve in line with
the development of relations between these two
countries and the European Union.
I I I. Parliarnentary action
in the Meditenanean regian
34. The member countries of WEU and the
European Union have not yet developed a cohe-
rent and viable policy on the Mediterranean for
the medium and long term. Interests in this area
diverge for geographic or historical reasons or in
terms of perception of regional issues. Neither
organisation has been able to respond clearly to
the expectations of other countries in the region,
foremost among which Turkey.
35. Apart from economic aid (the MEDA pro-
gramme), the European Union has not yet expres-
sed clear political aims for this region, owing to
the lack of a common foreign policy 
- 
still under
discussion since the entry into force of the Treaty
on European Union. The November Euro-Medi-
terranean conference'is an important step in the
dialogue, but the effectiveness of such an initiat-
ive can be judged only in terms of concrete deci-
sions. Nor should it be overlooked that the Euro-
pean countries around the perimeter of the
Mediterranean are more sensitive to the problem
than are their partners in Northern and Central
Europe. Nevertheless, as the existence of net-
works of Islamic extremists and support networks
for the activities of the PKK show, the conflicts in
the southern countries and the Kurdish question in
Turkey spill over into the territory of the Euro-
pean Union countries, becoming a source of
concern to the lafter.
36. However this may be, the fact remains that,
short of being seen in the context of a future
armed conflict between the two shores, European
security initiatives are disproportionate to the real
problems, which relate to the region's develop-
ment and management of its natural resources.
The creation of EUROMARFOR is an important
step towards developing WEU's operational capa-
bilities, but it must not be perceived by the sou-
thern countries as a military tool directed against
them. The dialogue between WEU and the coun-
tries of the region thus assumes its fulI importan-
ce as a means of avoiding misunderstandings and
dispelling suspicion of underlying political or
military thoughts. The aim must be to establish a
security partnership between the organisation and
these countries within the framework of the pro-
22. On 27th and 28th November the European Union will
meet with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Malta Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Ttrnisia, Twkey and the
Palestinian Authority. The United States and Ruisia were
not invited.
posed conference on security and co-operation in
the Mediterranean.
37. In this context it is of the uffnost importan-
ce for national parliaments and European parlia-
mentary institutions also to participate in the pro-
cess of dialogue and regional partnership. Their
action can contribute to a better understanding of
the problems and perceptions of the various
players in the region, be they governments or
regional units such as, for example, the Arab
Maghreb Union. In particular, the parliaments of
the WEU countries can make a substantial contri-
bution to developing fledgling democratic institu-
tions or establishing them in the countries of the
region where they are still lacking, thus helping to
reduce existing tension.
38. The European parliamentary institutions
with their more specific responsibilities have an
entirely different r6le; their action does not reflect
the potcy of a single nation but is the result of a
consensus among their members. The WEU
Assembly and the North Atlantic Assembly have
a shared interest in security and defence matters
and have frequently given expression to their
views on Mediterranean issues by developing
various proposals for settlement of existing pro-
blems. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil ofEurope, which in recent years has adopted a
Central and Eastern European focus, nevertheless
continues to pay close aftention to the develop-
ment of the situation in the region, essentially in
the areas of development and human rights. As to
the European Parliament, it plays a specific and
very important r61e in that it has power of co-deci-
sion with the Commission and the Council on
budgetary matters and approval of the agreements
in various areas between the Union and the Medi-
terranean countries.
(a) Parliamentnry ofiivitits and Meilitenanean hsues
39. Debates, questions to governments, collo-
quies and conferences, working visits and inter-
parliamentary dialogue are all aspects of the work
of national and European assemblies. The Medi-
terranean region is an abiding topic ofinterest in
the majority of these institutions, even though it is
dealt with differently from one counfiry to another,
depending on the perceptions of each one. The
WEU countries bordering on the Mediterranean
are those primarily concerned, but the gfowing
integration of WEU and European Union member
countries makes the problems common to all.
40. Interparliamentary institutions covering
more specific fields of action play an important
part in the context of the search for lasting solu-
tions to security and development questions. The
have the advantage of some consistency in their
action, despite changes affecting their composi-
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tion, while a new majority in a national parlia-
ment may, depending on the prevailing political
outlook, have a direct impact on its activities or on
its interest in the problems of the region.
1. Actian by natianal parliaments
41. The assemblies of the member countries of
WEU, either on their own initiative or in the fra-
mework of concerted action with their counter-
parts in other countries, show varying degrees of
interest in the problems of the countries around
the Meditenanean, greater, although not exclusi-
ve, interest being paid by the parliaments of the
countries on its shores. Debates, working visits,
dialogue with the assemblies of countries not
members of the organisation, specific aid pro-
grammes for democratic institutions and a
concern for development and human rights are
some aspects of day-to-day action endeavouring
to achieve relatively successful medium- and
long-term results.
(i) Germany
42. The Bundestag maintains bilateral relations
of differing intensity with several of the countries
of the region via its specialised committees, main-
ly through mutual contacts and visits. There are
also contacts via so-called bilateral or multilateral
groups of parliamentarians, which have increased
continuously since 1993. The most important ins-
truments for the work of these groups are study
visits to the countries with which a partnership
exists (all Mediterranean states, except Malta,
Serbia/Montenegro and Cyprus, although an
informal friendship group for Cyprus has also
been created), as well as invitations for delega-
tions ofthese partner groups to pay a study visit to
Germany. Furthermore, members of these parlia-
mentary groups regularly meet with representa-
tives of the Mediterranean countries (embassy
staff, ministers on visits to Germany).
43. The study visits focus mainly on the estab-
lishment or continuation of political contacts and
can also be seen as offers to provide information.
There are also contacts under the so-called inter-
parliamentary training programme, which has
been set up by the Bundestag and benefits mem-
bers of parliamentary administrations in particu-
lar, as well as contacts in the framework of staff
exchanges, in some cases on a mutual basis, bet-
ween parliaments. The Bundestag is also follo-
wing with close attention the evolution of the
political situation in the Mediterranean and espe-
cially in Tirkey, which has a large emigrant com-
munity in Germany, as the debates held at the time
of the Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq or the
questions put to the government on the ramifica-
tions of Algerian and Kurdish Islamic terrorism in
Germany serve to demonstrate.
(ii) Belgium
44. The activities of the Belgian parliament
concerning the Mediterranean are fairly limited,
due to the fact that Belgium is not part of the
Mediterranean region, but there is nevertheless a
degree of co-operation, structured around bilate-
ral friendship $oups between the parliament and
most of the countries of the region. In terms of
countries which are not members of the European
Union, the friendship goups for Cyprus, Algeria,
Tunisia, Israel and Turkey are the most active,
organising various activities such as meetings
with ambassadors and other dignitaries of the
region visiting Belgium and sending and recei-
ving parliamentary delegations. Nevertheless,
although the Chamber of Representatives and the
Senate have repeatedly adopted resolutions and
put numerous questions to the government on
security problems in the Mediterranean, on
Cyprus, on the Arab-Israeli peace process and on
the Kurdish question, for example, the Belgian
parliament does not appear to play a very promi-
nent r61e in the discussion on developing a policy
of co-operation between the two sides of the
Mediterranean.
(iii) Spain
45. The Senate and the Congress of Deputies
are actively engaged in preparing the Euro-Medi-
terranean Conference, to be held in Barcelona on
z7th-2SthNovember 1995, on the initiative of the
European Union of which Spain currently holds
the presidency. The two houses have prepared
reports expressing their parliamentary point of
view on the problems of the region, particularly
on the question of economic development and
prospects for co-operation. To this end, the cham-
ber has established a sub-committee of the ad hoc
Committee on co-operation and development aid
to deal with co-operation in the Mediterranean
region. The Senate has prepared a document on
Spain's policy of co-operation containing a pro-
posal for increasing technical help to all the
Maghreb countries in order to strengthen relations
between Spain and those countries at every appro-
priate level. Moreover, the Maghreb, like Latin
America, is regarded as a priority area in terms of
co-operation with Spain'?3.
(iv) France
46. The National Assembly and the French
Senate are actively engaged in defining Mediter-
ranean policy both at national and European
levels, as testified by their active support for the
MEDA prograrnme, involving financial and tech-
nical measures backing the reform of the econo-
mic and social structures of Mediterranean territo-
23. Informe de la Ponencia de estudio sobre la pol(tica




ries and third countries 2o and the ratification of
Euro-Mediterranean association agreements
which also contain measures providing for politi-
cal dialogue x. France, which is home to a large
Muslim community, mainly from the Maghreb
countries, is very sensitive to the evolution of the
economic and political situation in countries on
the southern shore. The Algerian situation and its
implications for France's security place this ques-
tion at the centre of the debates on the futuie of
the region and relations between France and its
Mediterranean neighbours. Bilateral groups of
parliamentarians are also very active at the level
of the two assemblies and their activities make a
decisive contribution to the development of the
dialogue and to a better perception of the policies
of each country. As regards parliamentary action,
the National Assembly and the Senate intend to
make an active contribution to the preparation of
the Euro-Mediterranean conference in November
1995, underlining the various aspects of a Medi-
terranean policy: political, security, economic and
social. For historical and political reasons, the
Mediterranean, and especially the Maghreb coun-
tries, are foremost among France's priorities in
terms of foreign and European policy as the
French National Assembly recalled when exami-
ning the preliminary draft general budget of the
Communities for 1996, by adopting, on 4th July
1995, a resolution insisting on the importance of
aid to Mediterranean counffies as well as to those
of Central and Eastern Europe.
(v) Greece
47. The Greek parliament plays an important
rdle in Mediterranean politics. A member of the
Interparliamentary Conference on Security and
Co-operation in the Mediterranean, established in
the framework of the Interparliamentary Union(IPU) in 1991, the Greek parliament is actively
participating in the preparation of the second
conference, to be held in Malta in November
1995. The Greek Delegation made a vital contri-
bution to the search for solutions to regional secu-
rity and social and economic development ques-
tions at the preparatory meetings held in Izmir
(Turkey), on 1Sth November 1994 and in Alexan-
dria (Egypt) on 3rd June 1995. Greek Delegations
intend to make a positive contribution to current
debates on regional problems in European parlia-
mentary institutions such as the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly
of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly, and to
make their Mediterranean point of view heard.
24. Countries and territories of the Maghreb and Machrek,
also Cyprus, Malta and Turkey; Assembl6e Nationale, Infor-
mation report 22ll,page 44, 6th September 1995.
25. The Euro-Mediterranean association agreement with
Tunisia is the first of this kind. It is to be followed by similar
agreements initially with Israel and Morocco; Assembl6e
Nationale, Information Report No 2152, page 56, l2th Jaly
1995.
(vi) Italy
48. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
regularly deal with various aspects of Mediterra-
nean questions. Italy,like Spain, France and Gree-
ce, has major territorial extensions (Sicily and
Sardinia) in the Mediterranean, whose security
and development is a subject of major importan-
ce. The proximity of areas of conflict and of
Libya, which is subject to a United Nations
-embargo, creates a situation of relative insecurityin the area, the evolution of which Italian parlia-
mentarians are monitoring very closely. This
concern is shown in debates in the two houses
and through questions addressed to the relevant
ministers on regional development, the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, problems of illegal
immigration and security matters in general. This
on-going concern is also expressed in interparlia-
mentary forums, such as, for example, the semi-
nar on security and stability in the Mediterranean
region organised in co-operation with the North
Atlantic Assembly in Capri on 10th-13th Sep-
tember 199426. In October 1995, the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Senate published a
report on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in
the framework of the Italian parliamentary contri-
bution to preparing the Euro-Mediterranean
conference in Barcelona. This text gives an
important place to questions of the environment,
energy resources and migration as factors of
regional interdependeice2l. The report proposes a
new European strategy based, on the one hand, on
a global development programme necessary forjoint security, the smooth running of economic
and scientific co-operation, dialogue and cultural
and human exchanges, and, on the other hand, on
the specific implementation of bilateral agree-
ments already signed or in preparation between
the Union and countries south of the Mediterra-
nean.
(vii) Luxembourg
49. Notwithstanding its geographic distance
away, Luxembourg is nevertheless concerned
with the problems of the Mediterranean, the
Chamber of Deputies having declared its interest
during debates and through questions to the
government. Luxembourg parliamentarians, who
are represented in the North Atlantic Assembly,
the WEU Assembly and the parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, are able to
express their opinion and position on the pro-
blems of the region on security and development
lssues.
26. Senato della Repubblica, Camera dei Deputati, )ilI legis-
latura; ANN, dossier sul Seminario Rose-Roth, Sicurezza e
stabiliti nella regione del Mediterraneo, Capri, 10th-13rh
September 1994.
27. Senato della Repubblica, Relazione della giunta per gli
affari delle communita europee su il partenariato euro-medi-




50. As in Belgium and Luxembourg, the place
accorded by the two Chambers of the Netherlands
Parliament to the discussion of Mediterranean
questions is somewhat limited. Nevertheless,
through the interparliamentary groups and during
debates on the country's European and foreign
policy, the problems of the Mediterranean are the
subject of discussions and exchanges of views
which help to create awareness of regional diffi-
culties among members and senators alike. Ques-
tions such as the situation of the Kurdish popula-
tion in Turkey or the evolution of the internal
situation in Algeria and its implications as regards
terrorism or bilateral relations 2E are dealt with
regularly and with careful attention in the two
chambers.
(i.x) Portugal
51. The Portuguese parliament is paying grea-
ter attention to Mediterranean problems, as shown
by the colloquy held on security problems in the
Western Mediterranean on 17th May 1995, organ-
ised by the Assembly of the Republic on the occa-
sion of the visit to Portugal of the Presidential,
Defence and Political Committees of the Assem-
bly of WEU. This colloquy brought together
experts from both shores in an exchange of views
that promoted better understanding of Mediter-
ranean problems, tackled from a political and
security angle and also from an economic, demo-
graphic and social perspective. In the framework
of parliamentary activity, the Assembly of the
Republic has furthermore ratified conventions
covering military matters with Morocco (1994)
and Tunisia (1995). Bilateral groups of parlia-
mentarians and the Pornrguese presence in Euro-
pean and transatlantic parliamentary institutions
have also made an important contribution to defi-
ning a European policy for the Mediterranean.
(x) United Kingdam
52. Despite its geographic distance, the United
Kingdom parliament has taken an interest in seve-
ral aspects of developments in the Mediterranean.
There are regular debates in the House of Com-
mons on the situation in Cyprus. Most recently, in
May 1995, the House of Lords Committee on the
European Communities produced a report on rela-
tions between the EU and the Maghreb countriesD.
That report noted the historic lack of knowledge
of that region in the United Kingdom, but also its
growing importance. The population in the region
was growing rapidly and both increased migration
and Islamic fundamentalism would have an
impact upon the European Union and its member
states. It noted that trade between the United
Kingdom and the Maghreb countries was increa-
sing, although from low levels. It observed that
developments in the region were also closely lin-
ked to other mafters of close interest to the Euro-
pean Union, such as the Palestinian question and
ielations with Israel, Turkey and Cyprus. The
report analysed some of the problems in the
region, most notably those relating to political
instability in Algeria. It concluded that concerns
over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, in
Morocco and Tunisia at least, had been exaggera-
ted. It saw unemployment as the most important
factor likely to contribute to instability in the
region, and argued that the European Union
should concentrate its efforts in the region on faci-
litating continued economic development,
emphasising that free ffade access was in some
ways more important than financial aid. It also
agreed that human rights performance should be
subject to detailed scrutiny by both the European
Parliament and the European Council as the ratifi-
cation of the association agreements with the
Maghreb countries proceeded.
(xi) Turlceylo
53. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is
following the development of European policy in
the Mediterranean attentively, especially as
regards bilateral relations and its funrre status in
the European Union. In this perspective, ratifica-
tion of the customs agrcement with the European
Union is a matter of priority for Tirkish parlia-
mentarians. Moreover, they regularly monitor the
question of Cyprus and political differences with
Greece. Parliamentary groups and delegations in
the principal European and transatlantic parlia-
mentary institutions voice Turkey's views on
questions relating to the security and development
of the Mediterranean. Discussion is at times heat-
ed, especially on sensitive subjects such as the
situation of Turkey's Kurdish population or
Cyprus, but the active presence of Turkish parlia-
mentarians in these institutions promotes dialogue
and leads to a better shared perception of the
points of view of all sides, in order to arrive at a
solution to outstanding problems. Since Greece's
accession to full membership of WEU, Turkish
parliamentarians attend and participate as associa-
te members in discussions in WEU committees
and debates in the Assembly.
2. European parliamentary institutions
54. Through their parliamentary activities,
these institutions of varying composition contri-
bute, each in its own specific field, to the search
30. Although not a full member of WEU, Turkey is a Medi-
terranean country whose development is very important for
the securiry and stability of the region as a whole.
28. See for example Second Chamber of the States General,
Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (Algerije),
23900Y. No.49,4th July 1995.
29. House of [,ords, Select Committee on the Ewopean Com-
munities, relations between the EU and the Maghreb coun-
tries; Session 1994-95, 1lth report, 9th May 1995.
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for solutions to the problems of the Mediterranean
region by constantly debating these questions,
addressing themselves to governments and publi-
shing studies and reports on the region. They play
an important r61e in the development of the dia-
logue between the Mediterranean players invol-
ved, and with other countries that are less sensit-
ive to regional problems. Alongside them,
mention should also be made of the Interparlia-
mentary Union, which, since 1992, organises
interparliamentary conferences on security and
co-operation in the Mediterranean.
(i) The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe
55. The evolution of the Mediterranean region
is one of the essential areas to which the organisa-
tion's activities are directed. Colloquies and
conferences, organised either by the Assembly
alone or in co-operation with other institutions,
together with numerous reports submitted on the
subject are evidence of the region's importance in
the eyes of the parliamentarians of the Council of
Europe. One of the most important initiatives
taken by this institution is the Conference of
Mediterranean regions, organised in co-operation
with the standing conference of local and regional
authorities of Europe. Three such conferences
have already been held, first in Marseilles on
27th-29th March 1985, then in Malaga on 16th-
18th September 1987 and most recently in Taor-
mina on 5th-7th April 1993, where questions rela-
ting to the environment, economic development,
co-operation and the problems of human migra-
tion were discussed in a regional perspective.
56. On 7th October 1994, rhe Assembly adop-
ted an important recommendation on co-operation
in the Mediterranean basin". In this text, several
proposals were formulated for the attention of the
Council of Ministers, recorrunending in particular
that it should:
- 
devote a special meeting to discussing the
r6le and activities of the Council of
Europe in the Mediterranean region
(11.i.a);
- 
devote special attention to the Mediterra-
nean ecosystem and commission scienti-
fic studies to gauge more accurately the
consequence of population development
for the region (11.i.e);
- 
ensure Council of Europe involvement in
ongoing discussions regarding the Medi-
terranean region, particularly within the
European Union, the CSCE, the working
parties set up by the oForum for Mediter-
ranean dialogue and co-operation"
( I I .iii);
- 
consider appropriate ways of involving in
certain activities of the Council of Europe
the Mediterranean non-member countries
which apply the principle of parliamen-
tary democracy, respect of human rights
and the rule of law (11.iv);
-consider the drafting of a partial agree-
ment on Mediterranean co-operation
open to Mediterranean non member
states of the Council of Europe (11.v);
Other points of this recommendation accord parti-
cular interest to migration (11.vii, viii, xi.b, c),
economic and social development (11.xi.a, b) and
cultural co-operation ( 1 1.xi.e);
(ii) The European Parliament
57. The Treaty on European Union granted the
parliament certain prerogatives in terms of co-
decision, especially in budgetary mafferso and of
ratification of agreements concluded on behalf of
the Union with the countries of the region,
making the parliament an essential player in Euro-
pean politics in the region. At the same time, the
Mediterranean debate is also a means for parlia-
ment to widen its powers and participation in the
decision-making process.
58. Through its reports and the resolutions
adopted, the parliament has declared itself in
favour of " a political global Community strategy
exceeding economic co-operation "32. This global
strategy is cenffed on the following ideas:
- 
co-ordination of all areas of Mediterra-
nean policy of the Union member states
in the context of the common foreign and
security policy of the EU;
- 
integration of economic, social, humani-
tarian, cultural and security measures of
the EU for the region;
- 
institutionalisation of a political dialogue
on matters of fundamental human rights
and the development of democratic struc-
tures;
- 
vertical globalisation of political co-ope-
ration by active involvement of parlia-
mentary representation and other non-
governmental organisations ;
- 
horizontal globalisation of co-operation
by the gradual approximation of EU poli-
cies vis-h-vis the subregional political
units in the southern Mediterranean(Maghreb, Machrek, Middle East) and
the establishment of common political
co-operation structures 33.
32. Working paper, Directorate General for Research, Euro-
pean Parliament: Towards a comprehensive policy frame-
work for relations between the European Union and the
Mediterranean basin, Political series, W-10,2- 1995.
33. Idem, page?t.
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31. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
Recommendation 1249, 7th October 1994.
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The European Parliament furthermore considers
that " the development of a consistent and realis-
tic Mediterranean policy ... is a marvellous oppor-
tunity to confirm its democratic claims both
inwardly and outwardly and hence to contribute
comprehensively to stability in Europe and its
immediate neighbourhood r.
(iii) The North Atlantic Assembly
59. As an informal parliamentary institution,
the Assembly pays particular attention to security
and defence problems in the region, promotes
many activities directed primarily towards deve-
loping trans-Meditelranean dialogue, as eviden-
ced by the granting of parliamentary observer sta-
tus to Egypt (1995), Israel (1994) and Morocco
(1994). These ties have been established follo-
wing the decision taken in Oslo in May 1994 to
indicate to the Mediterranean countries that the
Assembly is directly concerned by the security
and stability of this region and wishes to enter into
a global dialogue with the parliaments of these
countries3'. In this framework, it has been decided
to organise an annual seminar on the Mediterra-
nean in order to engage in and pursue a permanent
exchange of views between the parliaments north
and south of the Mediterranean on topics falling
within the area of responsibility of the North
Atlantic Alliance. Regional questions were also
the subject-matter of four " Rose-Roth oo semi-
nars, named after the two American parliamenta-
rians who originated this initiative of the Assem-
bly'u 
- 
held in Athens (1992), Grenada (1993),
Istanbul (1993) and Capri (1994). At the October
1995 session of the Assembly held in Turin, Italy,
Resolution 257 was adopted on the contribution
of the alliance to Mediterranean security. In this
resolution, the parliamentarians were " convinced
also that the frst priority for long-term security in
the Mediterranean basin is steady economic deve-
lopment supported by regional co-operation in the
southern and eastern Mediterranean countries "
and invited the North Atlantic Council " to pursue
the current dialogue with Egypt, Israel, Morocco,
Mauritania and Tunisia. "
(iv) The Interparliamentary Union
60. The Interparliamentary Union brings toge-
ther the representatives of 135 national parlia-
ments and three international parliamentary
assemblies, including the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe. Between 1973 and
34.ldempage22.
35. Senato della Repubblic4 Camera dei Deputati, XII legis-
latura; AAN, dossier sul Seminario Rose-Roth, Sicurezza e
stabilitd nella regione del Mediterraneo, Capri, l0th-l3th
September 1994, page 3 l.
36. The Rose-Roth seminars, dealing with various subjects
connected with European security and defence matters,
constitute one of the most prestigious initiatives of the
Assembly.
1991 the Union paid special attention to Mediter-
ranean questions in the framework of seven inter-
parliamentary conferences on security and co-
operation in Europe. In 1990 it considered that it
should take the initiative of a similar process to
respond to the problems and challenges existing
in the Mediterranean. This project took shape as
the Interparliamentary Conference on Security
and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM)
which held its frst meeting in Malaga, Spain, in
June 1992. The originality of these conferences
lies in the organisation of participation so as to
take account of the specific political conditions in
the area concerned. There are main participants
(the parliaments of the countries of the region),
associate participants (the WEU Assembly
belongs to this category) and observers (" out of
area " participants).
61. Drawing on the experience of the CSCE,
the Interparliamentary Union has established
three " baskets " to examine the range of Mediter-
ranean questions: regional stability, co-develop-
ment and partnership, dialogue on civilisation and
human rights. Following its frst conference, the
Union decided to organise a meeting of the parties
to the CSCM process on the occasion of each of
its two statutory annual conferences, thus estab-
lishing a perrnanent mechanism for dialogue and
negotiation at parliamentary level. Held twice a
year, these meetings allow consultation to be pur-
sued. They provide an opportunity for reviewing
the sefting up of an intergovernmental structure
for the CSCM and foster bilateral and multilateral
co-operation between the parties to the process. In
this framework, it has been decided to prepare a
second interparliamentary conference, held in
Malta from lst to 4th November 1995.
(b) The Assembly of WEU and Medilenanean questians
62. Mediterranean questions are followed
continuously by the Assembly and its committees.
Concerned with numerous problems of a political
and military nature, the Assembly, during its ses-
sions, has adopted many texts 37 relating to this
regron.
1. T'he col.d war periad
63. During the cold warthe Assembly obvious-
ly turned its attention to military and political
penetration by the USSR in the Mediterranean
region, especially in the 1980s. Hence the streng-
thening of the Soviet fleet, the increase in the sub-
marine threat, arms sales to several Arab coun-
tries in the region and then the renewal of a kind
of " Brezhnev doctrine " at the end of the 1970s,
followed by a growing strategic presence were




among developments frequently referred to and
condemned in various recommendations (160,
177,185,288, 313, 366 and 439). The latter were
characterised by a continual demand to strengthen
the capabilities of the alliance in the region, while
few references were made to WEU.
64. However, the WEU Assembly did not
concentrate solely on the East-West conflict and
on the tensions this caused in the Mediterranean
but took an interest in other topics of equal
concern, some of which are still topical.
65. This was particularly the case for the Arab-
Israeli conflict regarding which the Assembly had
always stated that it was in favour of a peaceful
and negotiated settlement. Urging the countries of
Western Europe to work towards direct negotia-
tions between Israel and the Arab countries, regu-
larly recalling conditions, without which peace
seemed impossible, specifying who relevant
intermediaries might be, the Assembly has
constantly demonstrated its interest in this pro-
blem (Recommendations 160, I77, 288, 313, 366
and 439). Similarly in each period of crisis, it has
strongly denounced any risk of escalating the
conflict or expressed its sympathy to all the popu-
lations concerned (Recommendations 185 and
2s4).
66. Among other subjects of concern during
the cold war period, mention can be made of
armaments proliferation (the Assembly having
repeatedly requested that " an international arma-
ments register should be established under the
auspices of the United Nations, which could
record every transaction by which participating
countries ... passed new or used arms to other
countries " (Recommendations 160 and 177),
regional conflicts such as Cyprus (Recommenda-
tions 160, 177,256,418 and 439), differences bet-
ween Greece and Turkey (Recommendations 177,
296,313,366 and 439) and Lebanon (Recom-
mendations 160 and 177); also the progress of
democracy and economic development in various
countries in the region. As to the state of demo-
cracy in the countries of the region, the Assembly
often deplored the establishment of non-parlia-
mentary or undemocratic rdgimes as in Greece in
1967 (Recommendations 160 and 177) or alterna-
tively welcomed signs of progress towards fairer
r6gimes in Portugal, in 1974 (Recommendations
254 and 288), in Spain (Recommendations 288
and 304) and in Turkey (Recommendation 366).
67. As to economic development in the region
and differences of level between the countries
concerned, the Assembly has made statements on
several occasions on the need for increased co-
operation with a view to achieving a profound
change in the social and economic structure of the
region and providing financial and technical help.
In 1960 it was a question of creating a Mediterra-
nean Development Organisation " through which
the United States and the industrialised countries
of Western Europe would contribute economic
and technical aid to those countries of the Medi-
terranean area, which are prepared to use aid on
economic development and not on military
adventures or inflammatory propaganda, and in
which both the donor and recipient countries
would participate " (Recommendation 160).
There is also reference to improvement of econo-
mic, cultural and technical co-operation in order
to create greater stability in the region (Recom-
mendations 177, 185 and 439).
68. The Assembly also recalls that free marit-
ime passage and energy supplies remain prior
conditions for any lasting economic development.
Thus it requests that " an international body
should be established under the auspices of the
United Nations to supervise the implementation
of the Convention of Constantinople of 1888
governing the passage of vessels through the Suez
Canal " (Recommendation 160) and urges com-
pliance with the Montreux Convention of 1936
concerning warship and aircraft-carriers (Recom-
mendations 160,254 and 288). Regarding oil sup-
plies, the Council advocated, in the event of a cri-
sis, adjusting reserves, diversifying sources of
supply, constructing large tankers and pipelines
and prospecting for oil in Europe and elsewhere.
(Recommendation 160).
2. New challenges in the Mediterranean
69. With the end of the cold war and the war in
the Gulf, East-West confrontation disappeared,
while a new North-South dimension is taking
shape in Mediterranean questions. Regional
conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and economic development will from
now on be in the centre of the Assembly's atten-
tion. Mediterranean questions are therefore no
longer analysed in terms of conflict between
blocs. Symptomatic of this new approach is the
fact that the recommendations adopted make no
mention of the r6le of NAIO in the region but
rather invite WEU to play an autonomous and
active r6le there in the service of European secu-
rity.
70. The aftermath of the Gulf war has raised
hopes of a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict with the start of negotiations between
Israelis and Palestinians, extended subsequently
to Jordanians and Syrians. The Assembly has
shown its support for this process, particularly by
recommending that the Council " in all areas
within its purview, pursue the action undertaken
by the European Council to allow Europe to help
to establish and then maintain peace in the Middle
East ... " (Recommendation 497). The favourable
conclusion of this peace process, essential for the
stability of the entire Mediterranean region, might
also lead to increasing Europe's responsibilities in
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fostering economic and social development,
peace and security in that region (Recommend-
ation 538).
7I. The idea of a Conference on Security and
Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) on
the same basis as the CSCE, now the OSCE, was
backed by the Assembly from the end of the Gulf
war. The aim sought was to ensure lasting peace
by taking account of the realities of the region.
The Assembly then asked the Council to " help to
prepare a conference on peace and security in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East by instructing
its Mediterranean sub-group to work out Western
Europe's positions on all matters relating to the
flrst basket ... " (Recommendation 497).lnrtially
it was a matter of bringing together a conference
on peace and security not only in the Mediterra-
nean but also in the Middle East. However, the
withdrawal of European diplomacy in the latter
region in favour of that of the United States led to
this idea being revised and the sphere of interest
of the conference being limited essentially to the
Maghreb-Machrek, Egypt and Israel.In 1993, the
Assembly asked the Council to commit itself to
the principle of a CSCM and, at the appropriate
time, pursue its establishment with vigour and
perseverance'o (Recommendation 538). The
Assembly also contributes, through its status of
associate participant, to the work of the Interpar-
liamentary Conference on Security and Co-opera-
tion in the Mediterranean.
72. After the Gulf war, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and chemical wea-
pons were constantly a subject of concern in the
documents of the Assembly. While specific
reports tackled this topic with reference to the
Mediterranean region (Documents 1339 and 1435
on anti-missile defence, Recommendations 533
and 571) many documents wholly devoted to
security in the Mediterranean expressed the view
that the proliferation of such weapons " might, if
confirmed, be a serious threat to peace and stabi-
lity in the Mediterranean region " (Recommenda-
tion 538). Among the weapons, the proliferation
of which has to be limited, are nuclear, biological,
chemical and conventional weapons systems. To
this end the Assembly has urged the Council to
" promote efforts by its member states, both in
their bilateral trade relations and in international
negotiations " (Recommendation 538) and to
endeavour to " promote the achievement of a
general agreement governing the possession of
and trade in arms in the Middle East and insist on
transparency in the arms trade by having the Uni-
ted Nations record contracts and sales " (Recom-
mendation 497).
73. The end of the cold war did not however
mean the end of regional conflict and the Assem-
bly, in its work, has not failed to stress this. Thus
the end of the Gulf war again brought the Kurdish
question to the fore. Iraq was condemned for its
attitude and WEU, further to the European Coun-
cil decision of 8th April 1991, was tasked with co-
ordinating military action undertaken to assist
Kurdish refugees, at the same time providing
them with essential humanitarian aid (Recom-
mendation 497). However, the Assembly quickly
made known its concern about the mounting vio-
lence in south-eastern Anatolia, which in 1992
prevented the Turkish Government from carrying
out the balanced policy it had announced towards
the Kurdish population in the region (Recommen-
dation 527) and recalled in May 1995 that the
refusal to grant the Kurds " some rights of cultural
self-expression and a form of political and admi-
nistrative autonomy ... " limited Turkey's possibi-
lities of being " integrated into Europe's intergo-
vernmental and supranational structures 'o
(Recommendation 580).
74. The Assembly continually monitors the
Cypriot question, which is still pending. Appro-
ving the initiatives of the United Nations, the aim
of which is to achieve the creation of a two-zone
federal state, the Assembly has stressed that " a
continued massive presence of Turkish armed
forces is one of the important issues standing in
the way of a solution to the Cyprus question " and
that " negotiations should be accompanied by a
full census of the population of the island of
Cyprus ... in order to solve the problems of sett-
lers " and has made clear that any progress
towards a settlement can be made only " in paral-
lel with a progressive withdrawal of Turkish
armed forces from northern Cyprus and their
replacement by United Nations peace-keeping
forces with a view to future demilitarisation of the
whole island ". Similarly it welcomes " the deci-
sion of the Permanent Council of WEU to engage
in a dialogue with Cyprus that will evolve with
the development of links between Cyprus and the
European Union " (Recommendation 580).
75. The Assembly attaches the same importan-
ce to achieving a breakthrough in negotiations
between the Greek and Turkish communities of
Cyprus and the settlement of differences between
Greece and Turkey. Although the two countries'
status in WEU is not the same (Greece is a fuIl
member, Turkey an associate member) the two
countries must be treated equitably in order to
limit their " differences over many issues which
could be solved if approached in a positive man-
ner " (Recommendation 527). These many un-
resolved differences between the two countries
" constitute a permanent threat to peace and stabi-
lity in the Eastern Mediterranean and stand in the
way of an effective European securiry and defence
policy in the region " (Recommendation 580).
76. As a parliamentary Assembly composed of
elected representatives of national parliaments,
the WEU Assembly is paying increasing attention
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to subjects such as human rights, minorities, eco-
nomic development and even cultural co-opera-
tion. Following on from some of its recommenda-
tions during the cold war period, the Assembly
has stated its position clearly on the need to pro-
mote economic and social development in the
Mediterranean, which it describes as essential for
reducing the imbalances existing at present bet-
ween states (Recommendation 497). Moreover it
remains " convinced that Western Europe's histo-
ric relations give it a specific responsibility to pro-
mote economic and social developments ... as
confirmed at the EC's Lisbon summit in 1992"
(Recommendation 538).
77. Regarding human rights and minority
rights, apart from the Kurdish question already
referred to, the Assembly has directed its attention
to the Palestinian problem. Indeed, by " laying the
foundations for a system of co-operation, good-
neighbourliness, co-responsibility and interde-
pendence between all countries in the region with
respect for human rights " it might be hoped to
obtain 'o respect for the legitimate rights of all
peoples in the region, including those of the
Palestinian people " (Recommendation 497). Nor
is the Assembly unaware that " there is growing
concern over the increasing threat of Islamic fun-
damentalist movements, while in some of these
countries terrorism may endanger the stability of
society " (Recommendation 538).
78. Finally, as regards cultural co-operation,
the Assembly has declared itself " convinced that
co-operation between universities and institutes
for research into and studies of security matters on
the northern and southern shores of the Mediterra-
nean might lead to better mutual understanding "
(Recommendation 538).
79. This non-exhaustive description shows
clearly that the WEU Assembly has steadfastly
followed problems and issues in the Mediterra-
nean region, noting the facts, insisting on impor-
tant points and formulating recommendations so
as to make a contribution to the evolution in pro-
gress in this region. Nevertheless, its limited
resources do not allow it to play as active a r6le as
other parliamentary institutions. This is one of the
reasons why it has delayed implementing the
decisions of the Council of Ministers for intensi-
fying the dialogue with the countries on the sou-
thern shore of the Mediterranean (Egypt, Israel
and the Maghreb countries). Indeed, the Assem-
bly has not been in a position to take practical
measures to this effect, for example by gfanting
guest or observer status to the parliamentarians of
the countries concerned, a deficiency it would be




Proffiratian and arms control in the Mediterranean
The Gulf war highlighted ttre dangers of pro-
liferation of advanced conventional munitions and
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East:
(i) Both Arab countries and Israel have
the ability to project power over far
grcater distances than in the past (Scud
missiles, SSMs, etc.).
(ii) There has been an increase in the
sophistication of combat aircraft in the
region, with gteater capability to pro-ject power over long distances using
in-flight refuelling and long-range
stand-off weapons.
(iii) There is a prospect for further nuclear
proliferation in combination with
long-range delivery systems.
(iv) There have been great improvements
in artillery and rocket systems that can
reach targets up to 100 km away.
Modern multiple rocket launch sys-
tems [MRLS] have ranges in excess of
60 km, and they will increase in the
future. Next generations of cruise mis-
siles will be able to hit targets perhaps
over 1000 km away.
The introduction of such technology into a
highly unstable region with unresolved conflicts
can only exacerbate existing tensions and it
increases the danger of an escalating arms race.
The playing fields are uneven. One country(Israel) already possesses a formidable nuclear
force while others possess very significant chemi-
cal, biological and missile capabilities. The asym-
metrical nature of the pace of the military
build-up itself can be a source of instability.
This is why arms control and confi-
dence-building have surfaced as a key goal for the
post Gulf war, post cold war Middle East. The
immediate objective of Middle East arms control
- 
to assure that Iraq never again assembles a large
and dangerous arsenal 
- 
should not distract from
the other concerns:
(i) Military upgrading and modernisation
in Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Syria.
(ii) Continuing chemical weapons pro-
grammes of Syria and Libya.
(iir) Sophisticated nuclear weapons and mis-
sile programmes in Israel, and growing
nuclear ambitions of lran and Libya
(iv) Certainry that large quantities of mili-
tary equipment made surplus as a
result of conventional arms reduction
in Europe will find their way to the
Middle East and the Mediterranean
region.
A variety of confidence-building and arms
limitation proposals have been advanced in initia-
tives such as the one proposed by the United
States in May 1991. The key elements of the Uni-
ted States plan included:
(i) a proposal to freeze and eventually ban
the purchase, production and testing of
SSMs;
(ii) a global ban on chemical and biologi-
cal weapons;
(iii) an effort by key suppliers to identify
the most dangerous conventional wea-
pons in the region and curb their sales(suppliers would also inform each
other of major sales);
(iv) a veifrable ban on the production and
acquisition of weapons-usable enri-
ched uranium and plutonium.
The 1991 Middle East arms conffol initiat-
ive, heavily dependent on diplomatic break-
throughs (especially in Syria) and changes in the
domestic priorities of other Arab countries, made
virrually no progress. The five permanent mem-
bers of the United Nations Security Council 
- 
also
the five principal weapons suppliers 
- 
met several
times to discuss mutual restraints on conventional
arms sales to the Middle East. However, they
agteed on nothing but banal generalities before
the effort collapsed in 1992. At the same time
major new arms sales to the region by all the key
suppliers were announced. A new forum among
arms suppliers aimed at co-ordinating and redu-
cing transfers could be organised, but competitive
pressures make it unlikely that supplier restraint
will achieve much without direct support from
recipient countries as well. It thus appears that, in
the future, Middle East arms restraint will rely
more on domestic factors and informal understan-
dings than on formal international agreements.
This undoubtedly is an improvement over the
uninhibited competition of the past, but it still is a
weak basis for long-term stability.
One positive development on specific arms
control relates to progress on chemical weapons.
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The draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
negotiated for over twenty years at the Conferen-
ce on Disarmament in Geneva, was sent to the
United Nations General dssembly for signature
and ratificationin 1992.It opened for signature in
Paris on l3th January 1993, but it still has not
entered into force and is unlikely to do so before
1996. The signatories include Algeria, Greece,
Iran, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and
Turkey. Greece deposited the instruments of rati-
fication. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya and Syria
have not signed yet. Led by Egypt, the League of
Arab states threatened to boycott the convention
in December 1992, demanding that Israel first
eliminate its nuclear weapons. However, several
Arab nations broke ranks to join the CWC as early
as January 1993. Most countries in the Middle
East will probably sign it eventually, although
most Arab countries are unlikely to ratify it until
some linkage with Israel's nuclear weapons is
forthcoming.
As far as biological weapons are concer-
ned, the Biological Weapons Convention was
signed on 10th April 1972 and it entered into
force on 26th March 1975. Most countries in the
Middle East and in North Africa signed it (except
Algeria,Israel and Mauritania), but very few took
further action.
In 1991, as part of the Madrid peace pro-
cess, minimal arms talks were organised under the
Arms Control and Security Working Group
(ACRS). The ACRS Working Group held five
plenary sessions; however, progress was slow as
parties focused on drafting a document of intents.
One major obstacle was Egypt's push for all
nations in the region to sign the NPT and Israel's
refusal to do so. Moreover, Syria's refusal to par-
ticipate (along with the absence of Iran, Iraq and
Lebanon) undermined the credibility of the talks
and highlighted the extent of regional differences.
However, the ACRS talks have not been comple-
tely unproductive. The most tangible accomplish-
ment is an agreement to establish a network of
Middle East conflict-prevention cenffes in Egypt,
Israel and Jordan, with a co-ordination centre in
The Hague to share information on troop move-
ments and exercises.
As far as multilateral agreements on
nuclear weapons are concerned, Algeria, Egypt,
Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Maurita-
nia, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey all
signed and/or acceded to the Partial Test Ban
Treaty (PTBT). The Non-Proliferation Treaty
(I.[PT) was ratified by Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Tur-
key. Mauritania acceded to the NPT in October
1993 and Algeria joined in January 1995. Israel
has not signed the NPT and does not intend to do
so until a stable peace is institutionalised in the
region. All those signatories are IAEA
member-states (except Mauritania), and IAEA
safeguards agreements are in force in all countries
in the region except Algeria and Syria.
In May 1995 the NPT Conference agreed to
extend the treaty indefinitely, without Israel and
despite fierce opposition by Egypt and the Arab
League. The latter eventually acceded to indefini-
te extension of the NPT, while emphasising that it
was a majority decision and that they did not
agree with the majority. The importance of the
creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone (NWFZ) was emphasised both during the
ACRS talks and in a specific resolution of the
final document passed by Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States. One of the exten-
sion resolutions of the NPT Conference also
emphasised the objective of creating a NWFZ; it
stated that "the development of NWFZs, especial-
ly in regions of tension, such as the Middle East,
as well as the establishment of zones free of all
weapons of mass destruction (W-MD)r should be
encouraged as a matter of priority." The NPT
Conference also passed a specific resolution on
the Middle East, which called on all states in the
region to join the NPT and to accept IAEA safe-
guards, but which did not mention Israel by name.
Some analysts have argued that the Middle
East and the Mediterranean region may be moving
towards an era of strategic deterrence based on the
acquisition of WMDs. According to those ana-
lysts, the era of massive conventional arming and
conventional wars experienced in the region bet-
ween the 1950s and 1980s is basically over. The
inability of most Middle Eastern states to provide
for national security by conventional means
impels them to the logic of relying on WMDs,
which are less costly to states in terms of political
and social stability, r6gime legitimacy or econo-
mic development. Middle Eastern states will pro-
bably continue to seek effective military power in
the future, and for most of them (especially those
that cannot rely on political and military support
from outside powers), the solution lies in the crea-
tion of a strategic deterrent based on WMDs.
Algeria
C o nv e ntio nal military c ap abilily
Numerically, Algeria is only second to
Libya on a regional scale, but it is clearly superior
to Morocco both in terms of area defence,
air-to-surface systems and interceptors, and in
numbers of tanks and ships. However, most of the
mat6riel is obsolete and decaying, and troops are
not trained for modern combat.
l. We consider nuclear weapons (NW), chemical weapons
(CW), biological weapons (BW) and ballistic missiles @M)
to be weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
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Muslim extremist terrorists continue their
campaign, targeting foreigners as much as the
security forces. The failure ofthe extensive para-
military and security forces to deal effectively
with internal insurgencies is drawing the regular
military into this task. The Algerian Government,
with some French aid, is fransforming a traditio-
nal conventional armoured and mechanised heavy
army into a more mobile force with nighrfighting
capabilities to deal with Islamic insurgents on a
continuous 24 hour basis.
Military budget
The military budget figures seem to be
increasing as of 1990, whereas military expendi-
ture figures tend to diminish. A possible explana-
tion could be that the economic difficulties expe-
rienced by Algeria have led to a freeze in real
military expenditures, while military budgets
have been inflated to cope with the civil war. In
Algerian dinars, the military budget rose from
6 070 in 1990 to 10757 in 1993. ln 1994, the bud-
get amounted $ 1.1bn.
High technology equipment / Modernisation
The army has ten more 2S3 152 mm SP
guns. During1992, fifty-three APCs were impor-
ted from Egypt.
For the air force, Algeria recently acquired
ten SU-24 strike bombers which gave it a
long-distance attack capability thanks to in-flight
refuelling. The rest of the force is composed of
rather obsolete aircraft (including 14 MiG-25
Foxbat A,70 MiG-23 MF Flogger G and 50
MiG-23127 Flogger B/D). It recently acquired fif-
teen more Mi-8/17 helicopters (5 attack models,
10 transport models). The most advanced AS
weapons are AS-10 Karen and AS-14 Kedge.
The navy combat forces include four SS,
three FF, 8 corvettes, ll-12 FAC, all obsolete
materiel of Soviet origin, except for two SS sub-
marines Kilo-class.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
Ballistic missiles (BM ):
Algeria has tactical missile capability. It
possesses 18 launching facilities for FROG-7(called 'Luna' in Russia) and FROG-4, with
50 missiles [Or: 12 FROG-7 launching pads with
32 missilesl. The FROG-7 has a range of 70 km.
Chemicalweapons (CW):
Algeria seems to have the research capabi-
lity to obtain chemical agents but there is no evi-
dence of operative capability. There are no appa-
rent signs of activity to reach such a goal.
Nuclearweapons (NW):
As of 1989 Algeria possesses a research
reactor in Ouera, which was built with the colla-
boration of Argentina. This reactor was placed
under voluntary safeguards in an agreement
which entered into force on 9th April 1990. Alge-
ria also has a larger plant (with a nuclear reactor
of 10-15 MW provided by China) under consftuc-
tion. The Algerian Government agreed to place
the Chinese-built reactor under safeguards and
declared its willingness to keep the IAEA infor-
med on bilateral co-operation with China.
Algeria signed the PTBT but did not take
further action. It finally acceded to the NPT at the
beginning of 1995. It is an IAEA member-state but
IAEA safeguards agreements are not in force yet.
Morocco
Modernisatian
Recently, the Moroccan arrny has taken
delivery of 240 United States M-60A3 tanks. Tlvo
Italian-built frigates, originally destined for Iraq,
have not yet been delivered.
Nuclear capabiliry
Morocco signed the PTBT in 1966, and it
ratified the NPT in November l970.lt is an IAEA
member state and IAEA safeguards are in force.
Morocco also ratified the Convention on Physical
hotection of Nuclear Materials.
There are no nuclear facilities in Morocco.
However, the government has mentioned that it
planned to build a nuclear plant by 2010-2020.
Maurilnnia
Mauritania signed the PTBT in 1964 and
acceded to the NPT in October 1993.lt is not an
IAEA member-state and does not possess any
nuclear reactor.
It has not signed the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC).
Tunisia
Tunisia signed the PTBT in 1965 and rati-
fied the NPT in February 1970. lt is an IAEA
member-state and IAEA safeguards are in force. It
does not have any nuclear facility.
Libya
C o nv e ntin nal military c ap ab ilif y
For many years the most troublesome
Middle East dangers appeared to come from
Libya, where Colonel Mu'ammar Kadhafi sup-
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ported every trendy revolutionary group and built
up massive stockpiles of advanced military hard-
ware 
- 
far more than his nation could ever deploy.
Libya was the first export client for Soviet
weapon systems like the Su-24 strike bomber and
the MiG-25 interceptor. Its purchases were also
instrumental in the emergence of new arms expor-
ters such as Brazil.
The earliest restraints on arms proliferation
in Libya came from abroad: China and Pakistan
refused to share nuclear warheads; Brazil and the
Soviet Union turned down requests for long-range
ballistic missiles. Tired of Kadhafi's political and
military excesses, Moscow became increasingly
less sympathetic. After the embarrassing defeat of
his forces in Chad in 1987, even Kadhafi lost
interest in military adventure. Economically wea-
kened and politically isolated, Libya ceased much
of its previous support for terrorism and allowed
its military establishment to atrophy.
Libyan helicopter holdings have been reas-
sessed: there are now 65 attack helicopters (5
more Mi-24 and 15 more Mi-35) and 19 more
transport helicopters (Mi8/-17 and Mi-2).
The navy combat forces include six SS
(Foxtrot ), 3 FF, 7 corvettes, 9 modern FAC and
15 older FAC.
Military budget
Military expenditures (calculated in
constant 1985 dollars) have been decreasing stea-
dily and quite rapidly. Even the figures at current
exchange rates seem to be declining until 1991.
The end of the cold war and the effects of the eco-
nomic embargo have resulted in the collapse of
military accounts. ln 1994, the military budget
amounted to $ 1.4bn.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
Tripoli has not ordered any major conven-
tional weapon since 1988. The United Nations
embargo on further arms sales that followed the
Lockerbie incident did raise some barriers, but it
did not bring Libyan arms import to a halt. Rather,
it imposed a choice that Libya had already made
itselt it increasingly invested in alternative tech-
nologies instead of conventional weapons, espe-
cially in chemical weapons (CW) and ballistic
missiles (BM).
Ballistic missiles:
Technology transfers and research pro-
grarnmes conducted by technicians hired on the
international market might lead to Libya increa-
sing its longer-range missile capabilities.
Libya's tactical mis sile capability :
- 
FROG-7 + Scud-B, l00launchers;
- 
or FROG-7, 20 + Scud-B/C, 72 with a
total of 298 missiles;
- 
or FROG-7,40 + Scud-B, 80;
- 
or FROG-7, 48 with a total of 144 mis-
siles + Scud-B, 80 with a total of 240
missiles.
Chemical weapons:
In 1985, Libya built a huge chemical
dual-use complex. The Rabta complex was inau-
gurated in 1988.
In addition to the Rabta complex, it appears
that a second plant is currently under construction
near Wafa, 80 km south-east of Tripoli.
So far, most of the technical assistance has
come from Swiss and German companies and
technicians, as well as from Japanese technicians.
Also, in February 1995, Libya was suspected to
have sought CW information from South Africa.
Biological weapons:
Protection and decontamination materials
are available and all SSM launching sites have
NBC protection. It is important to note that Libya
signed the BW Convention in 1982, without
taking further action.
Nuclear capabilities:
Libya has attempted to achieve nuclear
capability for years and Kadhafi has called for the
need of an " Islamic bomb ". However, it signed
the PTBT in 1968 and joined the NPT in 1975. It
also became a IAEA member state and IAEA
safeguards agreements are in force. It possesses a
small research reactor of 10 MW (LWR type)
located in Tajora, which was provided by the
Soviet Union. Moreover, it seems that work on a
40 MW reactor has begun.
Egvpt
C onv entional military c apability/ Modernisation
Egyptian armed forces are considered
among the best in the Arab world, despite some
deficiencies in C3 I and in the weapon/military
personnel ratio. Cairo has one of the most impor-
tant defence industry in the Arab world (IAO).
Egypt has been one ofthe greatest beneficia-
ries of the end of the cold war, receiving at low or
no cost hundreds of 1960s-vintage M60-A3 tanks,
armoured personnel carriers, and other equipment
decommissioned by United States forces in Europe
(e.g., Hawk Phase Itr SAM, C-130 transport air-
craft, KC tankers, etc). This o'cascade " allowed
Egypt to get rid of 195Os-vintage Soviet hardware,
but it has not brought a significant improvement in
Egyptian offense potential.
Egypt's navy has a strong nucleus of
conventional submarines 8-10 SS Romeo (four of
which are Chinese type 033). An order has been
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placed recently for two conventional submarines
Oberon-class from the United Kingdom, to upgra-
de the obsolete Russian and Chinese subforce. In
addition, the first of four Chinese-built Romeo-
class submarines has returned after modernisation
in the United States. More serious modernisation
will include the gradual acquisition of 550 M-l
tanks and some 160 F-16 fighters. The latter will
constitute the real nucleus of Egypt's future mili-
tary capability. In May 1993, fifteen F-16 C/D
and forty F-16 C were delivered to Egypt. The
air force has also taken delivery of its first two
Turkish-assembled F-16 aircraft and44 have been
ordered to be delivered by the end of 1995.
Despite the limits imposed by United States
aid policy, Egypt has displayed little interest in
domestic arms production and has concluded few
major agreements with European or former Soviet
Union suppliers; this is probably due to the nation's
economic difficulties, and because peace with
Israel has removed any motive for such investrnent.
Milirary bud.get
Egypt has the highest military expenses in
the region (in real terms). The end of the cold war
and of the conflict with Israel have resulted in a
slow but constant decrease in real military expen-
ditures. This trend is confirmed by the GDP/mili-
tary expenditures ratio.
Military Balance and SIPRI agree that there
has been a constant increment in military expen-
ditures in monetary terms (be it in billions of dol-
lars or in millions of Egyptian pounds), but the
Israeli estimate is two or three times more impor-
tant than that of Military Balance. ln 1994, the
military budget amounted to $1.8 bn.
Weapons of mass destructinn (WMD)
ln order to compensate for the lack of
nuclear capabilities and to counterbalance what
Egypt perceives to be Israel's awesome conven-
tional and non-conventional force, the conventio-
nal military has increasingly been seeking bac-
king up by a basic and minimum force based on
chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, and possibly
biological warfare agents. Egyptian analysts call
these WMDs " basic deterrence " because they
are less sophisticated than nuclear weapons.
Ballistic missiles:
Since the 1960s Egypt has been attempting
to acquire serious ballistic capabilities with the
assistance of various countries. For instance, a
1989 project 
- 
in collaboration with the Soviet
Union for the missiles themselves, North Korea
for design and technical assistance, and haq for
financing 
- 
led to the development of the Scud
100 (which has an estimated range of 600 km). It
is important to note that the Scud 100 has the
same characteristic as the so-called Scud-PIP
(Froduct Improvement Plan) developed in North
Korea with Egyptian and Japanese assistance.
North Korea is also a regular supplier of domesti-
cally produced Scud-B missiles for Egypt.
Chemical weapons:
Egypt's chemical capabilities are also
extensive. It is worth mentioning that it still
refuses to join the CW Convention unless Israel
joins the NPT. Egypt produces most of its decon-
tamination materials and possesses Soviet NBC
protection. A number of plants for the production
of blood and nerve agents (with small stocks of
bombs, shells and launchers) still exist today.
Moreover, industrial infrastructure that could
allow the rapid production of hydrogen cyanide is
also available.
\n 1992 Israeli sources pointed to Egypt's
CW production capability, but did not allude to
ttre possible deployment of CW, since a defensive
capability was considered sufficient by Egypt.
Biological weapons:
Egypt has signed but not ratified the BW
Convention, and it is believed to have developed
biological warfare agents by the early 1970s.
Nuclearweapons:
Egypt signed the PTBT n 19@ and raffied
the NPT in February I97l.lt is a IAEA member
state and IAEA safeguards agreements are in force.
It possesses one research reactor of 2 MW,
later upgraded to 5 MW with East German and
French assistance, located at Inshas. Construction
of a22 MW research reactor supplied by Argenti-
na began in autumn 1994. ln an interview publi-
shed on 1st August 1994, Chur of the Egyptian
Atomic Energy Authority Fawzi Hammad said
Egypt planned to build the reactor to use " in the
field of agriculture, industry, technology and
monitoring of radiation. " In addition, the existing
reactor at Inshas would be modernised as well.
Egypt also planned to begin mining uranium
deposits in Sinai and the eastern desert before
1997. It would install laboratories, research
devices and equipment near the mining operations
to process the uranium ore. This would be strictly
for energy purposes. Another project, still lacking
funding, is an accord with Westinghouse for a Sidi
Kreir-l 600 MW reactor (PWR type) and with
Framatome for two 2000 MW reactors (PWR
type), to be located at Al Da'aba.
Even though one of the key people in the
Iraqi Osiraq project was an Egyptian engineer,
Egypt does not seem to be seriously engaged in
military nuclear projects. It seems to have made
the decision that its security does not require
nuclear weapons a long time ago. Egypt has been
taking a strong position against the introduction or
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region.
However, whether this traditional position will be
maintained by the Egyptian Government remains
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to be seen. In May 1995 the NPT was indefinitely
extended, without Israel's inclusion and against
Egypt's will. After the 1995 NPT Conference,
Arab analysts and intellectuals began debating the
question whether Arab nuclearisation might be




The Israeli defence industry is undoubtedly
the best one in the Middle East and it has interna-
tional renown. It has developed considerable tac-
tical and sffategic missile and space capabilities,
and the aerospace and conventional arms industry
is extremely advanced. However, the decrease in
military budgets is forcing the defence industry to
diversify production (circa30Vo is now produced
for civilian use) and to conduct an aggressive
export policy.
It is worth mentioning that the end of the
l99l war did not trigger an Israeli military invest-
ment programme comparable to those that follo-
wed previous wars. Despite the fact that Israel's
economy is healthier than it has been in more than
a decade, growing by over 5Vo a year in the
mid-1990s, defence is being cut. Instead of buil-
ding it up, Israeli leaders seek to trim defence
where possible while preserving existing military
capabilities
Military budget
Military expenditures as a share of GDP
decreased from 1988 to 1991, even if expendi-
tures in real terms have slightly increased during
the Gulf war. ln 1994, the military budget amoun-
red to $7.2bn.
High technolagy equipment / Modentisatian
The Israeli army has taken delivery of sixty
more Merkava Itr tanks and a new heavy APC, the
Achzarit, is being introduced (no other army has
introduced heavy APCs). The army is also purcha-
sing a number of MLRS from the United States.
The navy has commissioned the first of three
Eilat-class corvettes. The Eilat are Sa'ar 5 and are
being built in the United States, but with weapons
systems installed in Israel. They are armed with
Harpoon and Gabriel SSM as well as Barak SAM,
and can embark a helicopter. In February 1994 the
Kidon missile craft., a Sa'ar 4.5, was relaunched(Sa'ar 4.5 models are rebuilt and improved
Reshef-class missile boats and will also be armed
with Harpoon, Gabriel and Barak).
The air force listing has been substantially
revised. The conversion of two squadrons from
F-4E to Phantom 2000 has been completed. Addi-
tional numbers of Kfir, F-4E and A-4 aircraft have
been taken out of squadron service; (some may be
refurbished and offered for export). The air force
is to purchase some twenty F-15 L costing about
$100m each, and there are plans to replace the
remaining Kfir and A-4 aircraft with fifty
second-hand F-16 from surplus United States air
force stocks. (Delivery began in August 1994).
Finally, the air force attack helicopter capability
has been increased by adding twenty four more
AH-64A Apache helicopters.
In January 1994 Israeli industries unveiled
a new missile warning device, Piano, which
employs passive, electro-optic technology. Deve-
lopment of the ATBM Arrow continues, largely
financed by the United States, although Arrow is
no longer a component of the United States ballis-
tic missile defence programme. An Arrow test
was made in June 1994 when atfigetmissile was
successfully intercepted for the frst time. In July
1995 Israel conducted the first test launch of the
Arrow-2 missile. Israeli officials said that the
Arrow-2 medium-range ballistic missiles inter-
ceptor could be deployed operationally within 18
months. It has a range of 100 km and an intercept
altitude of 40 km.
Israel launched the Ofeq-3 surveillance
satellite in April 1995; it is believed to be the first
link in a space-based ballistic early warning sys-
tem which Israel is developing to counter the per-
ceived missile threat from neighbouring coun-
tries. A communication satellite, Amos-l
(possibly with the capability of eavesdropping on
Arab satellites) was scheduled for launch in Sep-
tember 1995.
Weapons of mass destructinn (WMD)
Nuclear weapons (NW) and ballistic
missiles(BM):
Israel signed the PTBT in 1964. However,
it has not joined the NPT. (The treaty was exten-
ded indefinitely in 1995 excluding Israel). It is an
IAEA member state and IAEA safeguards agree-
ments are in force, although the state still does not
accept full-scope inspections. In 1981, the IAEA
suspended technical assistance to Israel because it
refused to allow some verifications. Israel also
signed the Convention on Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials.
The government argues that a political
peace settlement would need to be in place before
Israel could support nuclear disarmament efforts.
However, while attending an ACRS meeting in
Jordan in November 1994, Mr. Peres signalled
that Israel would accept inspection of its facilities
once a comprehensive peace was reached in the
region and after an accord had been reached on
ridding the region of NW. Israel does support the
creation of a Middle East NWFZ, but it views
such multilateral agreement as the last step in the
peace process. The Israeli position focuses on
23
DOCTJMENT 1485 APPENDIX
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and politi-
cal accommodation 
- 
such as those that took place
in the ACRS talks 
- 
as the necessary precursors.
Mr. Rabin once said that Israel would call for a
series of bilateral nuclear agreements with the
various Arab countries.
Israel, generally believed to have nuclear
weapons, has nevertheless stated that it would not
be the first to introduce them to the region. It
bombed Iraq's Osiraq reactor in June 1981 and
took further steps to deter other countries.
In 1956 a French-Israeli accord led to the
construction of a nuclear reactor in the Negev
desert at Dimona. The26 MW reactor was upgra-
ded to 150 MW. Nuclear proliferation analysts
have estimated that Israel possesses a diversified
nuclear and thermonuclear arsenal of 100 to 200
warheads. Those warheads can be mounted on
Lance, Jericho 1 (YA-l) and Jericho 2 (YA-3)
missiles. Jericho 2 is an Intermediate Range Bal-
listic Missile (IRBM) and has a range of
1200-1500 km. It is important to note that in a
theatre of small dimensions such as the Middle
East, tactical weapons can be used as strategic
weapons. ln November 1993,a specialised review
revealed that a secret launching base forJericho 1
and Jericho 2 missiles existed near Jerusalem.
Israel cancelled plans for a third nuclear
power station in March l994.ln September 1994,
the IAEA restored technical assistance to Israel.
The international community is currently attemp-
ting to convince Israel to block the production of
fissile material for military use in the plants that
still are not under IAEA supervision. A fissile
material cut-off has been proposed to Israel as
part of a compromise on the NPT by the Clinton
Administration. (Israel and the United States met
in May 1995 in Helsinki to discuss the fissile
material ban). This could be a future-oriented bar-
gain, explicitly ignoring the past while implicitly
acknowledging its reality. It would require Israel
to accept some kind of verification of its adheren-
ce, but would not affect past production. On 5th
April 1995 Foreign Ministers Peres and Moussa
met in Paris to discuss some formulas that might
reassure Egypt while not committing Israel to
acknowledge its nuclear arsenal. The two sides
agreed to upgrade the multilateral arms control
talks to the level of Foreign Ministers.
Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in
October 1994.lt was the first between Israel and
an Arab counfiry since the 1979 teaty with Egypt.
The third and final stage of the Arab-Israeli peace
process, scheduled to begin in May 1996, will
include negotiations on security arrangements. In
September 1995 a major agreement was conclu-
ded by Israel and the Palestinians. The Egyptian




The futility of building further numerical
superiority became evident to Damascus in 1986.
Syrian officials ceased speaking of pursuit of
" strategic parity " with Israel and allowed defen-
ce purchases to decline rapidly. Purchase of
Soviet-sryle equipment continues to this day, but
at a much slower pace.
Since 1988, a total of 70 MiG-29 atrcraft
have been ordered to replace a force of some 300
obsolete MiG-2ls and MiG-23s. The MiG-29 forcn,
may grow to 120-150 by the end of the decade.
It has become increasingly difficult for
Syria to match Israel's qualitative superiority;
hence the recent shift in Syrian policy. A political
dialogue with Israel was one result. Another result
was a long-term shift in armament sfrategy, pla-
cing less emphasis on the ability to win wars
through conventional forces; instead, Syria will
increasingly tend to rely on WMDs.
Weapons of mass destructinn (WMD)
Syria signed the PTBT in 1964 and ratified
the NPT as early as September 1969.It has been
an IAEA member state for a long time but only
signed IAEA safeguards agreements in 1992.
Syria also signed the BW Convention without
taking further action.
Syria has no nuclear weapons nor a nuclear
programme to obtain them. However, in 1985 and
1986, the Synan defence minister declared that the
Soviet Union would guarantee delivery of nuclear
weapons if Israel attacked with nuclear weapons.
In 1991 China's sale of a micro-reactor
caused a certain amount of concern, but Syria
abandoned plans for a small power reactor in
October 1992.
Before and during the 1995 NPT Conferen-
ce, Syria called upon Israel to accede to the NPT
so that the states of the region would be able to
agree on extending the treaty. Foreign Minister
Farouk-al-Shara told the frst committee of the
UNGA that the accession of all states in the Midd-
le East to the NPT constituted a vital step toward
transforming the region into a WMDs-free zone.
Greece and Tarkey
Taking advantage of NAIO's ability to
reduce conventional forces under the CFE treaty
by " cascading " them into alliance partners,
Greece and Turkey each received hundreds of
tanks and other pieces of equipment in 1993,
coming mostly from the United States and Ger-
many. Turkey alone received 1 017 tanks and
Greece accepted delivery of725 tanks.
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CFE ceilings to be reached by November 1995
Tanks ACVs Artillery Aircraft Helicopters Torar-
GnsBcB 1 735 2 534 1 878 650 18 6 815
Tunrcv 2785 3 t20 3 523 750 43 t0 231
National holdings of treatyJimited equipment
January 1994
Tanks ACVs Artillery Aircraft Helicopters PrnsoNNsr-
Gnspce 2 435 r 421 2063 494 0 163 705
Tumey 3 358 I 964 3 390 428 35 575 963
January 1995
Tanks ACVs Artillery Aircraft Helicopters PensolwBr-
GnsBcB 2 r39 2283 2079 511 0 t6t 332
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